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DEVELOPMENTS IN EEC COPYRIGHT
PANEL DISCUSSION
AUDIENCE MEMBER: When you talk about the enforcement
mechanisms under the Berne Convention--or the Paris Conven-
tion-going to the International Court of Justice, which nobody has
done yet, comprising a retaliation; I agree with that. But I see that
as a non-issue in approaching the neighboring rights problem. It
may be that one of the reasons we're in the GATT is we don't
have enforcement mechanisms under the Berne Convention. Is it
an issue?
MR. METALITZ: I would certainly agree with that as far as
Berne as it stands now is concerned. Of course, this is a lively
topic for the Berne Protocol discussion, the idea of incorporating
some enforcement mechanisms. Secondly, there is the negotiating
record on GATT TRIPS. And third, I think there are simply some
subtle expectations about what kind of enforcement would be ex-
pected for copyrights.
What concerns us in the sui generis unfair extraction right is
simply that the Database Directive says that Member States shall
adopt an enforcement procedure. As a practical matter, the entire
project of harmonizing by a new form of protection, this unfair
extraction right, could be completely undermined if a Member State
were to provide extremely weak or onerous or formality-laden
enforcement mechanisms. If that were to happen, it would not
achieve harmonization as a practical matter, and it would certainly
create a great deal of uncertainty as these enforcement mechanisms
were being developed.
The point that was mentioned about equitable remuneration in
the motion picture area is a good example. If each Member State
decides on a standardless, or relatively standardless, basis on how
to enforce one of these rights or how to limit the exceptions to
these rights-that's again another issue with the Database Direc-
tive, the compulsory licensing provisions-then the issuance of the
Directive is really just going to kick off a long period of uncertain-
ty, and one that may end up with a system that is less harmonious
than what we have now.
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Part of the negotiations in the Data-
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base Directive was on the enforcement mechanisms, the same way
as we are doing in the GATT. One of the problems with GATT
is that it hasn't addressed this problem. But we have to address it.
So I see this as being as important to address as any of the other
problems that GATT has successfully addressed.
AUDIENCE MEMBER: I think everyone here shares the goal
of harmonization. If we are moving toward harmonization, we
would not want to introduce a concept that is basically foreign or
not contained in the copyright laws of any country. Equitable
remuneration is really, it strikes me, a sort of bizarre concept. But
basically it seems like a very non-copyright idea, and one that
seems to lead away from harmonization since it's contrary to all
the copyright experience of the various countries.
DR. VERSTRYNGE: I want to answer certain of the remarks
which were made here.
It is clear that if you could achieve through the mere operation
of a system the result where all, the rightsholders would be properly
remunerated, you could dispense with the provision on equitable
remuneration. The problem is, experience shows that that is not
exactly so.
We tried in the Council negotiations some other alterna-
tive-like making collective harmonizations compulsory---or hav-
ing a Scandinavian regime, or extending collective bargaining.
There were certain ideas. But we couldn't reach agreement on
those; we could only reach agreement on equitable remuneration.
We wanted to have in a situation where we increased the pro-
tection, the guarantee that one category of rightsholders would not
run off with all the benefits. It is to the extent that we are pushing
the increased protection for others, and we think it is legitimate to
do so when increasing the revenues. You may agree or disagree
with that, but that's what the Council decided.
On the points which were made by Professor Hansen, you have
to watch out what is guaranteed because the subsidiarity in the
Maastricht text does not apply to areas of exclusive jurisdiction of
the Community. The internal market is an area of exclusive juris-
diction of the Community. So that, whenever the market is
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blocked, there is an obligation to harmonize and there is no possi-
bility to say, "Well, we'll leave that on the side because it is not
important." That obligation does not exist. It exists only outside
of the internal market blockage.
So far, we have harmonized most things where the European
Court of Justice, through its case law and the use of Article 36, did
show that the market was blocked. Coditel, which was properly
explained, shows that you didn't have an internal market. Patricia
explained that on duration you didn't have an internal market.
Warner explained that on rental rights you didn't have an internal
market....
The argument comes with private copying: Does private copy-
ing block the internal market? Well, it doesn't exactly block the
internal market, but it distorts the internal market. If some coun-
tries are going to have levies on machines and tapes and others are
not going to have it, and you open up the borders and you make
every control at the borders illegal, obviously, people will import
the machines and the tapes in the countries where they don't have
to pay the levy and re-export them to the other countries, and that
is going to destroy the French and the German and the other re-
gimes on private copying.
How long is this distortion going to be permitted to go on? I
believe you have a valid internal market argument on which to
base private copying legislation. What is not clear is how to deal
with this problem. I don't know what the result will be because
the Commission hasn't decided, so I cannot tell you any more than
what has happened so far.
Another point which I want to make is that I disagree with Mr.
Sorkin on the contract problem. I disagree for the very simple
reason that the Berne Convention itself says that it's the law of the
country where you exploit the work that governs the protection;
that's what the Berne Convention says. That's what the French
Supreme Court used to give priority to the territoriality of copy-
right law or for contract law. His ideal of making a free choice of
contract flies in the face of that provision of the Berne Convention.
I must warn you against this approach because my understand-
1993]
54 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP., MEDIA & ENT. L.J.
ing of how Community law works-not in the copyright area, but
in general-is that it is territorial. So when you come with your
products or your services into this territory, it is the law of the
Community which applies. So you can make any contract in the
world or any country in the Community which you like, but you
cannot go away from the fact that copyright law is governed by the
law of the Community in combination, as Mr. Fleury has correctly
pointed out, with the transposition of the Member State law in
accordance with the Directive. But you cannot maintain that you
can go away from that and then apply some freedom of contract.
We had that problem to begin with in the Software Directive,
where of course the temptation was that once we have begun the
reverse engineering derogation, it would be then free for the con-
tract, that the parties could decide in a contract whether or not they
could have another regime than the one we have laid down in the
reverse engineering provision. But the Directive clearly says that
any contract contrary to Article 6 on reverse engineering is null
and void. So that is a clear example where we legislated to have
the opposite effect.
I think that you have to watch out when music, or movies, or
whatever are exploited in the Community. It is the Community
law which applies to it. I do not think that the Court of Luxem-
bourg will move away from that position. That was tested in front
of the Court by the antitrust rules. They didn't budge; they said
it's the law of the Community which applies even to agreements
which are made outside of the Community.
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